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DUELING OVER DUAL-USE GOODS: THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE’S MISGUIDED 
ATTEMPT TO PROMOTE U.S. SECURITY AND 
TRADE WITH CHINA THROUGH 
RESTRICTIVE EXPORT CONTROLS 
On July 6, 2006, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register a proposed 
version of what has come to be known as the “China Military Catch All 
Rule.”1 The rule proposed not only to tighten U.S. export licensing policy 
for certain goods destined for China but also to create a program for trusted 
Chinese end-users to facilitate trade.2 The published notice requested public 
comment on the proposed rule “in order to obtain the benefit of a variety of 
viewpoints before publishing any final rule.”3
And comment the public did. During the ensuing months, in which BIS 
extended the comment period an additional month,
 
4 over fifty individual 
comments were submitted, totaling nearly 1,000 pages.5 For just under 
twelve months, this public and often contentious debate unfolded over what 
final form, if any, the rule should take.6 Generally, the debate pitted 
American businesses and exporters—proponents of liberalized trade 
controls on China—against the United States government and, more 
specifically, the Commerce Department, which view such trade controls as 
effective tools of foreign policy and national security.7
The publication of the final version of the China Military Catch All 
Rule
 Ultimately, the 
United States government and the Commerce Department prevailed and 
heavy restrictions were placed on trade. 
8
                                                                                                                 
 1. Revisions and Clarifications of Export and Reexport Controls for the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC); New Authorization Validated End-User, 71 FED. REG. 38313 (July 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter Proposed Rule]. 
 2. Id. at 38313–14. 
 3. Id. at 38316. 
 4. R.G. Edmonson, Comment period on dual-use export rules extended, JOURNAL OF COM., 
Oct. 19, 2006. 
 5. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Christopher A. Padilla, The 
Future of U.S. Export Controls on Trade with China, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 29, 2007, 
available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2007/padilla02012007.htm [hereinafter Padilla 
1/29/07]. 
 6. See, e.g., Exporters Urge BIS to Reconsider China ‘Catch-All’ Rule, MANAGING IMPORTS 
AND EXPORTS, April 2007, available at LEXIS (describing the publishing of the proposed rule as 
“kicking up a veritable storm among U.S. exporters”). 
 7. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 8. Revisions and Clarifications of Export and Reexport Controls for the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC); New Authorization Validated End-User; Revision of Import Certificate and PRC 
End-User Statement Requirements, 72 FED. REG. Vol. 33646 (June 19, 2007) [hereinafter Final 
Rule]. 
 on June 19, 2007 has been hailed by the government as embodying 
“one of the most important changes to export control policy in many 
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years.”9 In an op-ed in the San Jose Mercury News, Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Industry and Security Mario Mancuso argued that the new 
rule “strike[s] the right balance in our complex relationship with China” by 
“support[ing] U.S. companies in competing successfully in China while 
restricting the export of technologies that would contribute to China’s 
military modernization.”10
In reality, the new rule will most likely do quite the opposite. The 
China Military Catch All Rule will not only negatively impact American 
business interests in China, but will also do little to slow China’s military 
modernization and may even undermine U.S. national security. Part I of this 
note provides a brief overview of U.S. dual-use
 
11
Part III provides an evaluation of the immediate and long-term 
consequences of the rule’s implementation, both in the United States and in 
China, and addresses three specific implications. This note will first argue 
that the rule unnecessarily expands liability for U.S. exporters, as well as 
for entities throughout the supply chain. The specter of harsh penalties 
requires greater due diligence efforts to ensure that these newly controlled 
items do not end up bolstering China’s military. These developments make 
the costs (administrative or otherwise) of doing business for U.S. exporters 
in China greater,
 export controls and then 
specifically addresses those with direct application to China in order to 
place the new regulations in the proper context. Part II examines the final 
incarnation of the China Military Catch All Rule in detail, highlighting both 
the changes between the proposed and final versions and the major changes 
to current U.S. dual-use export control policy. 
12 while making their foreign counterparts more attractive 
to Chinese buyers,13 thereby further fueling the political time bomb that is 
America’s ballooning trade deficit with China.14 Second, the rule will 
undermine U.S. business competitiveness in China and in other markets. 
The final rule is strictly unilateral in nature as the United States has been 
unable to convince a single ally to adopt similar restrictions.15
                                                                                                                 
 9. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 10. Mario Mancuso, Securing our Exports to China: New Rules Can Limit Military’s Access to 
High Technology, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2007/oped06_18_07.htm.  
 11. The term “dual-use” is defined as “[i]tems that have both commercial and military or 
proliferation applications.” See 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2007). 
 12. Letter from 23 Organizations to Stephen Hadley, (Sept. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.usaengage.org/storage/usaengage/Publications/2005_09_nftc_catchall.pdf. 
 13. William Reinsch, “Future of Export Controls,” Remarks to the Practicing Law Institute 
(Dec. 11, 2006), available at http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View 
&articleid=1843&Category=All. 
 14. Li Ruogu, Real Issues in China-US Trade Imbalance, CHINA DAILY, May 9, 2008. 
 15. Memorandum from Paul Freedenberg, Ass’n for Mfg. Tech., on Overview of the China 
Military Catch-All Regulation to the Interested Parties (June 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.amtonline.org/document_display.cfm/document_id/55349/section_id/103/overviewoft
hechinamilitarycatch-allregulation. 
 With many 
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of these items available elsewhere, Chinese firms are likely to turn to 
foreign competitors for their products.16 Likewise, due to the rule’s 
extraterritorial application through its reexport provisions,17 foreign 
companies will increasingly “design out” U.S. components in their 
products, damaging U.S. economic interests in other markets as well.18 
Third, this new economic reality will mean that U.S. businesses are 
competitively disadvantaged in their dealings in the hyper-competitive 
Chinese market. This will reduce the profits they have to re-invest in cutting 
edge research and development (R&D). Because the Pentagon now relies 
primarily on commercial technology to equip America’s military,19 a 
reduction in private sector R&D for high-technology will only serve to 
jeopardize U.S. military superiority,20 a result fundamentally contrary to the 
stated goal of the rule itself.21
I. U.S. DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS 
 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS22
The United States emerged from the wreckage of World War II as the 
undisputed leading economic power in the world, even though, 
paradoxically, international trade was an insignificant component of 
America’s economic prowess.
 
23 Despite playing the preeminent role in 
international trade and global financial markets, the domestic market was 
the United States’ primary concern after the war.24 Faced with the onset of 
the Cold War and the division of nations into ideological blocs,25 the key 
objective at the core of U.S. export controls—and those of its allies26
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. 
 17. Reexport is “an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the [Export 
Administration Regulations] from one foreign country to another foreign country.”  15 C.F.R. § 
772.1 (2007). 
 18. THE COALITION FOR SECURITY AND COMPETITIVENESS, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
MODERNIZING EXPORT CONTROLS ON DUAL-USE ITEMS 7 (Mar. 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.securityandcompetitiveness.org/files/dual-use_recommendations.pdf. 
 19. Michael Hirsh, The Great Technology Giveaway?; Trading with Potential Foes, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 2 (1998). 
 20. Robert L. Paarlberg, Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. 
Security, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 122, 129–30 (Summer 2004). 
 21. “In general, however, this rule proposes certain revisions and clarifications to licensing 
requirements and policies with regard to the PRC and more precisely reflect U.S. foreign policy 
and national security interests.”  Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33646. 
 22. For a much more expansive and detailed look at the history of U.S. export controls, see 
WILLIAM J. LONG, U.S. EXPORT CONTROL POLICY 13-68 (1989); Dual-Use Export Controls in 
Historical Perspective, in RICHARD T. CUPITT, RELUCTANT CHAMPIONS: U.S. PRESIDENTIAL 
POLICY AND STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS 31–50 (2000). 
 23. U.S. EXPORT CONTROL POLICY, supra note 22, at 14. 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.g., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. 
—was 
 26. At this time, America’s allies were in the process of rebuilding after the war and “were 
little concerned about export policy.” However, the United States was able to secure “allied 
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to restrict the ability of the Soviet Union and its satellites to acquire key 
items that would aid their military development,27 as well as to “inflict 
[upon them] the greatest economic injury” possible.28 The establishment of 
the Coordinating Committee for the Control of Multinational Trade 
(CoCom)29 in 1949 embodied this strategy,30 seeking to prevent the West 
from fulfilling Lenin’s prediction that “the capitalists will sell [the 
communists] the rope with which we will hang them.”31
CoCom, an informal agreement among like-minded states,
 
32 sought to 
control three categories of goods: conventional arms, nuclear-related items, 
and dual-use items.33 Of the three, the dual-use restrictions were the most 
controversial as they inevitably restricted normal commerce, limiting the 
trade of goods and technologies that had both civilian and military 
applications.34 This impact primarily fell on U.S. exporters for a number of 
reasons.35 First, even though all CoCom members pledged to restrict 
controlled dual-use technology, “the United States was the most zealous 
export controls enforcer.”36 Second, U.S. businesses had a virtual monopoly 
in dual-use technologies for much of the Cold War.37
                                                                                                                 
cooperation through the enormous economic leverage the U.S. trade and aid policies exerted in the 
years immediately following the Second World War . . . .”  LONG, supra note 22, at 17–18. 
 27. Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands: Complying with Export Controls on 
Technology Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441, 450 (2003); 
DOUGLAS E. MCDANIEL, UNITED STATES TECHNOLOGY EXPORT CONTROL 97 (1993). 
 28. LONG, supra note 22, at 15. 
 29. For an in-depth study of CoCom, see MICHAEL MASTANDUNO, ECONOMIC 
CONTAINMENT: COCOM AND THE POLITICS OF EAST-WEST TRADE (Cornell Univ. Press 1992) 
(noting that “export control policies and their coordination in CoCom have been an integral part of 
the postwar international system [and that] to understand them is to understand more fully the 
dynamics of that system.”). 
 30. LONG, supra note 22, at 17. 
 31. Corr, supra note 27, at 449–50. 
 32. THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER, STUDY GROUP ON ENHANCING MULTILATERAL 
EXPORT CONTROLS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY, FINAL REPORT 16 (Apr. 2001). 
 33. Corr, supra note 27, at 451. 
 34. Id. at 451–52. 
 35. One expert has characterized export controls as a structural cost “paid primarily by the 
United States to maintain a liberal international economic order during a time of severe U.S.-
Soviet rivalry.”  See LONG, supra note 22, at 14.  See also, MASTANDUNO, supra note 29, at 28 
(noting that “the history of U.S. export control policy has been one of subordination of business 
interests to the pursuit of national security and foreign policy goals by the state. American firms 
have been consistently frustrated by the Byzantine nature of the U.S. control system, their variable 
access to it, and their inability to influence decisively the substance of policy.”). 
 36. Corr, supra note 27, at 452; William J. Long, Global Security, Democratization, and 
Economic Development after the Cold War: New Goals for U.S. Export Control Policies, in GARY 
BERTSCH, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS 
67–68 (1994) [hereinafter Long, Global Security]. See also MASTANDUNO, supra note 29, at 13, 
18 (arguing that during 1949–58 and 1980–84, the United States, through the use of CoCom 
controls, sought to engage in “economic warfare” against the communist bloc). 
 37. Corr, supra note 27, at 452. 
 Thus, due to CoCom 
restrictions, large and potentially lucrative markets overseas were simply 
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off-limits to U.S. exporters.38 This de facto monopoly on dual-use 
technologies actually had the somewhat surprising effect of ameliorating 
potential American business displeasure at these broad controls, as “it was 
quite unlikely that another country, particularly a non-CoCom country, was 
in a position to supply the technology” to these closed markets.39 This 
potential discontent was further placated by the seemingly endless Pentagon 
budget, which showered U.S. companies with lucrative contracts for the 
domestic military market.40 Additionally, in line with widespread public 
anti-communism, many business groups actively voiced their opposition to 
trade liberalization with the Soviet Union and its satellites.41
This honeymoon was not to last, however, as by the mid- to late-1970s 
foreign companies had begun to close the technological gap, prompting 
U.S. companies to face greater competition.
 
42 As business leaders and the 
export community pushed for liberalized export controls, especially in light 
of uneven enforcement among CoCom members,43 the U.S. government 
took the opposite approach and pressured CoCom to become even more 
restrictive, so that by the end of the 1980s, “the United States presided over 
an increasingly restive CoCom alliance.”44
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
the rationale underlying CoCom was no more and CoCom was disbanded in 
1994.
 
45 It was replaced in 1996 with the establishment of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use 
Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement),46 a voluntary, loose 
association of thirty-three like-minded countries.47
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. 
 39. Corr, supra note 27, at 452. 
 40. Jeff Gerth & Eric Schmitt, The Technology Trade: A Special Report; Chinese Said to Reap 
Gains In U.S. Export Policy Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at A1. 
 41. LONG, supra note 22, at 13–24; CUPITT, supra note 22, at 82; MASTANDUNO, supra note 
29, at 28. 
 42. Corr, supra note 27, at 452; MCDANIEL, supra note 27, at 97; Long, Global Security, 
supra note 36, at 65. 
 43. U.S. allies in CoCom long favored more narrowly tailored strategic control on East-West 
trade, given their “relatively greater economic interest in East-West trade and their preference for 
a less confrontational political relationship with the Soviets.”  MASTANDUNO, supra note 29, at 
13. 
 44. Corr, supra note 27, at 452–4 (highlighting the key role played by the “Toshiba-Kongsberg 
incident,” where two Japanese and Norwegian companies transferred advanced milling machines 
and related technology to the Soviet Union in violation of CoCom). 
 45. Id. at 455; see also Michael Lipson, The Reincarnation of COCOM: Explaining Post-Cold 
War Export Controls, THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 34 (Winter 1999) (arguing that the 
decision to disband CoCom “was driven by increased sensitivity to national economic 
competitiveness in a globalizing economy, concerns that controls were inhibiting market reforms 
in former communist states, and a sense that CoCom was overly dominated by the United 
States.”). 
 46. For a detailed history on the transition between CoCom and the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
see Lipson, supra note 45, at 33. 
 47. Corr, supra note 27, at 455 n.35. 
 The Wassenaar 
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Arrangement’s primary goal is to “promot[e] transparency and greater 
responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and 
technologies.”48 The Wassenaar Arrangement essentially requires members 
to notify each other of transfers of listed exports after the transfer has taken 
place and when licenses for similar transfers are denied.49 Under the 
Wassenaar Arrangement, unlike with CoCom, members no longer have 
veto power over another member’s exports, there is no requirement for pre-
shipment notification of exports and members are left to implement the 
Wassenaar controls solely at their own discretion.50 This has prompted one 
security specialist to describe the Wassenaar Arrangement as a “‘chat 
society’ with no teeth,”51 while others have noted that it “is proving to be 
mostly a paper tiger.”52 Indeed, one former U.S. defense official has said 
that the United States destroyed CoCom “in a reckless way, before there 
was a replacement regime” and that the Wassenaar Arrangement “doesn’t 
control anything” and is “basically a reporting society.”53 These lax 
requirements apparently have done little to boost compliance, as a 2002 
U.S. government study found that many members were delinquent in their 
reporting requirements.54
The dissolution of CoCom and its replacement with a weaker regime 
reflected the policies of the Clinton administration and many of its key 
officials, most notably William Perry, a Silicon Valley executive who was 
tabbed to be the deputy defense secretary.
 
55 At his 1993 Senate 
confirmation hearing, Perry stated that controlling dual-use exports was a 
“hopeless task.”56 He further stated that dual-use controls “only interfere[] 
with our companies’ ability to succeed internationally.”57 Perry concluded 
that efforts to control dual-use technologies in the post-Cold War era would 
be futile, and that export promotion was the way to bolster America’s 
industries in the increasingly globalized economy.58
                                                                                                                 
 48. See The Wassenaar Arrangement, Guidelines and Procedures, Including the Initial 
Elements, July 2004, available at http://www.wassenaar.org/2003Plenary/initial_elements 
2003.htm. 
 49. Corr, supra note 27, at 455. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Richard Read, U.S. Trade, Security Interests Clash Over Tech Exports to China, THE 
OREGONIAN, Feb. 3, 2003, at A07 (quoting James Mulvenon). 
 52. Hirsh, supra note 19, at 2. 
 53. Peter H. Stone, High-Tech’s High Anxiety, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Vol. 30, No. 50, Dec. 12, 
1998, at 2926 (quoting Peter Leitner). 
 54. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROLIFERATION: STRATEGY NEEDED TO 
STRENGTHEN MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES, GAO-03-43, 10, 13–4 (2002). 
 55. Stone, supra note 53. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Gerth & Schmitt, supra note 40. 
 58. Hirsh, supra note 19. 
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With some exceptions, the Clinton years were generally marked by the 
systematic easing of dual-use export controls.59 However, the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 “changed the focus of the Bush 
Administration and Congress from liberalization and streamlining to 
tightening controls and increasing scrutiny of export transactions and 
technology transfer.”60 This shift can be seen most superficially in the name 
change of the Commerce Department bureau in charge of dual-use export 
controls from the Bureau of Export Administration to the Bureau of 
Industry and Security.61 It can be seen more substantively from the recent 
comments of Bush administration officials that economic policies and 
national security policy are becoming “increasingly intertwined”62 and that 
“[e]xport controls do not exist in a policy vacuum, isolated from broader 
issues of national or international concern [but] . . . are guided by and 
reflect larger U.S. foreign policy and national security imperatives.”63
B. U.S. DUAL-USE EXPORT CONTROLS ON CHINA 
 
In line with this shift in focus, it is now “a clear and unwavering 
principle” that U.S. export controls must be subservient to broader U.S. 
strategic aims, “reflect[ing] and support[ing] America’s larger foreign 
policy toward China.”64 That such a security-dominant mantra was 
advanced by the assistant secretary of Commerce for export 
administration—ostensibly a position concerned with the promotion of 
expanded trade—aptly demonstrates how the agency primarily responsible 
for U.S. export control administration views its primary purpose with 
regard to China.65
                                                                                                                 
 59. Gerth & Schmitt, supra note 40; Stone, supra note 53; Thomas Friedman, U.S. Ending 
Curbs on High-Tech Gear to Cold War Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1994, at A1. 
 60. Corr, supra note 27, at 459. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Christopher A. Padilla, The 
Future of Export Controls, STATES NEWS SERVICE, May 15, 2007, available at 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2007/padilla05152007.htm [hereinafter Padilla 5/15/07]. 
 63. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 64. Id.; see also Mario Mancuso, Technology Leadership, Economic Power, and U.S. National 
Security: U.S. Dual-Use Trade with China, Keynote Address to the Heritage Foundation, Feb. 20, 
2008, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2008/mancusoheritage02202008.htm (stating that 
U.S. “export controls do not, in a strict sense, ‘balance’ trade and security . . . .  As a national 
security bureau within an economic agency, our most solemn obligation is to protect the security 
of the nation. And there is nothing of comparable (or near comparable) worth against which we 
‘trade-off’ U.S. security.”). 
 65. It could very well be argued that this security-dominated view is not confined only to 
China. See Corr, supra note 27, at 461 (noting that after September 11, 2001, “BIS shifted its 
posture somewhat, emphasizing security and tougher export controls. It has been more reluctant to 
promote the interests of U.S. exporters when faced with opposition from the traditionally tougher 
agencies such as the Defense and State Departments.”). 
 However, there must be a balance between security and 
trade, especially with regard to China and its much-ballyhooed market of 
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1.3 billion people.66 Consequently, “export controls must also take into 
account our complex relationships with emerging powers and economies. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of China.”67
On the one hand, Bush administration officials talk of promoting 
“China’s peaceful economic development”
 
68 and encouraging Beijing’s role 
as a “responsible stakeholder”69 in the international system. Export controls, 
they argue, support this policy by “facilitat[ing] hundreds of millions of 
dollars of civilian high-technology trade annually,”70 thus expanding trade 
and increasing economic interdependence between China, the United States 
and the global marketplace.71
On the other hand, China’s continued military modernization, 
characterized by its rising military budget, is making Washington nervous.
 
72 
The Department of Defense estimates that China’s military spending has 
increased by double-digit percentages each of the past fifteen years, with 
China’s officially announced 2008 military budget rising to approximately 
$58.8 billion.73 However, both the U.S. government74
                                                                                                                 
 66. The notion of a single market of 1.3 billion people is actually rather illusory. The reality of 
China’s domestic market is that no such unity exists so as to tie together the divergent tastes, 
needs and proclivities of China’s population. Often, markets exist solely within cities or certain 
economic zones. See Getting Past the Hype of China’s 1.3 Billion Customers, China Law Blog, 
Aug. 15, 2007, available at http://www.chinalawblog.com/2007/08/chinas_13_billion_ 
customers_an.html. 
 67. Padilla 5/15/07, supra note 62. 
 68. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5; China itself used to refer to its own “peaceful rise” but the 
implications contained therein made many of its neighbors nervous. It has since begun referring to 
its “peaceful development.”  See Evan S. Medeiros, China Debates its ‘Peaceful Rise’ Strategy, 
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE, June 22, 2004, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ 
display.article?id=4118; China Committed to Peaceful Development, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 30, 
2006, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-04/30/content_581391.htm. 
 69. Robert B. Zoellick, Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? Remarks to the 
National Committee on United States-China Relations, Sept. 21, 2005, available at 
http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf (“[I]t is time to take 
our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system: We need to 
urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.”). 
 70. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 71. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Mario Mancuso, Enhancing 
Secure Trade with China, Remarks to the U.S.-China Business Council, June 18, 2007, available 
at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2007/mancuso06182007.htm. 
 72. David Lague, China Plans Steep Increase in Military Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/world/asia/05china.html?n=Top/News/World/ 
Countries%20and%20Territories/China. 
 73. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter W. Rodman, The 
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee, June 22, 2006, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military//library/congress/ 
2006_hr/060622-rodman.pdf; Lague, supra note 72 (reporting that China’s 2008 military budget is 
to increase by 17.6 percent to approximately $58.8 billion). 
 and non-government 
 74. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 25 (2007), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf (noting that 
China’s official budget leaves out many large expenditures, and therefore China’s total military 
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experts75 estimate actual military expenditures to be two to three times the 
official Chinese government budget.76 Still, even using the high-end of 
these credible estimates, the Chinese defense budget pales in comparison to 
what the Pentagon spends annually.77 Additionally, while China has 
certainly become more transparent regarding its military buildup,78 much 
uncertainty remains.79 Indeed, even if the United States or the international 
community knew more about China’s command and control structure, its 
nuclear posture or its submarine capabilities, such knowledge would 
provide no insight into Chinese motivations or intentions. The fundamental 
question is not whether China is going to become a world power, but what 
will China do once it has that power.80
In response to this and other uncertainties, the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy towards China has been to “prudently hedge against . . . 
[China’s] rapid military buildup.”
 
81 The term “hedging” in this context is 
manifested by “pursuing policies that, on one hand, stress engagement and 
integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist-style balancing 
in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national 
military modernization programs.”82
                                                                                                                 
budget for 2007 is between $85 billion and  $125 billion, 1.9 and 2.8 times, respectively, the 
officially announced figure of $45 billion) [hereinafter CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT]. 
  This “delicate balancing act” allows 
one state “to maintain its extensive and mutually beneficial economic ties 
 75. See, e.g., Keith Crane, et al., MODERNIZING CHINA’S MILITARY: OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CONSTRAINTS 243 (2005), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/ 
RAND_MG260-1.pdf (estimating that China’s military expenditures for 2003 should be 1.4 to 1.7 
times the officially announced number). 
 76. Lague, supra note 72. 
 77. The Pentagon’s budget for Fiscal Year 2007 was $439.3 billion. See Office of 
Management and Budget, Department of Defense, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/defense.html. The Pentagon’s budget for Fiscal 
Year 2009 is $515.4 billion, a 7.5% increase over the previous year’s budget. U.S. Department of 
Defense, News Release: Fiscal 2009 Department of Defense Budget Released, Feb. 4, 2008, 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/2009_Budget_ 
Rollout_Release.pdf. 
 78. China recently committed to provide previously undisclosed military figures to the United 
Nations in an effort to assuage international concerns regarding the transparency of its military 
modernization effort. See China promises more military transparency, SPACE WAR, Sept. 2, 2007, 
available at http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_promises_more_military_transparency_ 
999.html. 
 79. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 80. Variations of this question are posed in Evan S. Medeiros, Strategic Hedging and the 
Future of Asia-Pacific Stability, 29 WASHINGTON QUARTERLY 145, 147 (Winter 2005–06) 
(raising the following questions: “even if China is currently a rising power with limited aims, will 
it evolve into a revolutionary power with revisionist goals that challenges the regional or even the 
global order?  Will China’s diplomatic and military propensities change over time as it 
accumulates material power and status?”). 
 81. Padilla 5/15/07, supra note 62. The term “hedging” vis-à-vis China is also used in other 
official U.S. government publications. For example, see OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, 
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT 30–31 (2006), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf. 
 82. Medeiros, supra note 80, at 146. 
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with” the other state and its neighbors “while addressing uncertainty and 
growing security concerns about the other.”83
As a key component of this strategy, it is stated U.S. policy to use 
export controls to deny the export, reexport or transfer of any items “that 
would make a direct and significant contribution to China’s military.”
 
84 
Keeping in mind the potential economic cost, Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce Padilla has noted that U.S. “export controls must reflect the 
duality inherent in this policy and must distinguish between different kinds 
of customers within a large and diverse economy.”85 Indeed, China, like 
almost any other trading partner, “contain[s] an assorted and varying mix of 
attractive trade opportunities and security risks.”86
Being able to differentiate between legitimate civilian end-users and 
those posing as fronts for the military has become an increasingly important 
task for Washington, given that no other country in the world makes “more 
organized efforts to obtain and illegally export controlled U.S. technology” 
than China.
 
87 Such efforts are highlighted by a number of export control 
cases brought in the United States in recent years for attempts to export 
controlled technology to China.88
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 146. 
 84. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 85. Padilla 5/15/07, supra note 62. 
 86. Mancuso, supra note 71. Indeed, one commentator has called China the “poster child for 
the double-edged nature of the globalization of technology.”  Adam Segal, New China worries, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY, Sept. 22, 2007. 
 87. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5. 
 These cases underpin the rationale behind 
 88. For example, seven people were arrested in New Jersey in July 2004 for the illegal export 
of components for electronic warfare systems, smart weapons, radar systems, and communication 
equipment to China in violation of the federal Arms Export Control Act. Noting that past 
shipments were believed to have ended up with the Chinese military or institutions affiliated with 
the military, authorities said that the arrests were the latest in a crackdown on what they believed 
to be “a covert network in the United States that purchases sensitive weapons technology.”  Seven 
Arrested for Illegal Transfers of Weapons to China, ASIAN EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 7, 
Aug./Sept. 2004, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/asian/pdfs/aeco_0408.pdf; see 
also Four New Jersey Residents Sentenced for Illegal Exports to China, INTERNATIONAL EXPORT 
CONTROL OBSERVER 9, May 2006, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/pdfs/ 
ieco_0605e.pdf. Four months later, the California-based Interaero Inc. was fined $500,000 and 
placed on five-year probation for illegally exporting six shipments of missile and jet fighter 
equipment worth $40,000 to a Chinese entity. See U.S. and German Companies Accused of 
Illegally Exporting Military Parts to China, ASIAN EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 16, Dec. 
2004/Jan. 2005, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/asian/pdfs/aeco_0412.pdf. In 
February 2005, BIS placed a Temporary Denial Order on the Wisconsin-based Wen Enterprises, 
its president Ning Wen, and his wife Hailin Lin for “conspiring to sell electronic components 
controlled under U.S. Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to [a Chinese entity] without the 
proper licenses over thirty times from June 2002 through September 2004.”  Temporary Denial 
Order Issued for Unauthorized Transfers of Electronic Components, ASIAN EXPORT CONTROL 
OBSERVER 9–10, Feb./Mar. 2005, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/asian/pdfs/ 
aeco_0502.pdf. Ning Wen was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to 5 years in jail. His 
conviction was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. U.S. v. Ning Wen, 
477 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2006). In February 2006, Ko-Suen Moo, a Tawainese national, was 
charged in U.S. federal court with being a Chinese covert agent and attempting to acquire and 
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U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement89 deeming “China’s aggressive 
and wide-ranging espionage as the leading threat to U.S. technology.”90 It 
would appear, however, that the effort to acquire sensitive dual-use items is 
not confined to the United States.91
 These attempts to procure U.S. high-technology dual-use items 
come as little surprise given that China’s continued military modernization 
is increasingly reliant on commercial technologies.
 
92 This reality might be 
more directly related to cost-efficiency rationales than weaknesses in 
China’s military industries, though that remains an unsettled point.93
                                                                                                                 
export military components and weapons to China. Taiwan National Charged with Plotting Illegal 
Export of Engines, Missiles to China, INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 10–11, Mar. 
2006, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/pdfs/ieco_0603e.pdf. On May 17, 2006, Moo 
pled guilty in the Southern District of Florida to export violations, as well as bribery and 
conspiracy violations and acting as an agent of a foreign government. See U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Factsheet, Select Arms & Strategic Technology Investigations (ASTI), Nov. 
2006, available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/iceasti.htm [hereinafter ICE Factsheet]. 
 89. A Department of Defense report states that since 2000, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement officials have “initiated more than 400 investigations involving the illicit export of 
U.S. arms and technologies.” See CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT, supra note 74, at 29. For a 
partial list of recent ICE investigations relating to arms and strategic technology investigations, 
see ICE Factsheet, supra note 88. 
 90. CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT, supra note 74, at 29. 
 The 
Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military power states 
 91. E.g., Head of Russian Space Company Arrested for Allegedly Transferring Dual-Use 
Technologies to Chinese Entity, INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 22–24, Dec. 
2005/Jan. 2006, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/pdfs/ieco_0512e.pdf; Illegal Export 
of Unmanned Helicopters to China Reveals Gaps in Export Control Awareness in Japan, 
INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 4–5, Feb. 2006, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/ 
pdfs/ieco_0602e.pdf; Sensitive Machine Tool Exports from Taiwan to China, INTERNATIONAL 
EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 6–7, May 2006, available at 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/pdfs/ieco_0605e.pdf; Yamaha Motor Receives Fine for 
Attempted Unlicensed UAV Transfer to China, INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 7–
8, Mar./Apr. 2007, available at  http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/pdfs/ieco_10e.pdf. 
 92. Padilla 1/29/07, supra note 5; see also Adam Segal, The Civilian High-Technology 
Economy: Where is it heading? Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/ 
written_testimonies/06_03_16_17wrts/06_03_16_17_segal_greenberg.php; Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and National Disclosure Policy Beth M. 
McCormick, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Mar. 
17, 2006, p. 2, available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written_testimonies/ 
06_03_16_17wrts/06_03_16_17_mccormick.php. 
 93. Roger Cliff, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, Mar. 16, 2006, p. 5, available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/ 
written_testimonies/06_03_16_17wrts/06_03_16_17_cliff.php (noting that to the extent that 
certain designs and technologies are available from foreign sources, “it probably has not made 
sense for China to attempt to develop completely new types of weapons” due to cost-efficiency). 
However, Richard Bitzinger has argued that from this same trend, “one may infer that the Chinese 
military remains dissatisfied with the quality and capabilities of weapon systems coming out of 
domestic arms factories” or that these factories cannot produce the requested weapons in sufficient 
amounts. See Richard A. Bitzinger, Modernizing China’s Defense Industries: How Effective Have 
Been Recent Reforms? Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/ 
written_testimonies/06_03_16_17wrts/06_03_16_17_bitzinger.php. 
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that “[m]any dual-use technologies, such as software, integrated circuits, 
computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications, and 
information security systems, are vital for the [Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army’s] transformation into an information-based, network-centric 
force.”94 Given that China lacks the capability to indigenously produce 
many of these and other key dual-use technologies, Beijing has had “to 
obtain from abroad through legal and illegal commercial transactions”95 
items for use in such high-value systems as submarines,96 missiles,97 and, 
potentially, an aircraft carrier.98 U.S. officials expect these efforts to 
continue.99
II. THE CHINA MILITARY CATCH ALL RULE 
 
It is in this context that BIS announced the final China Military Catch 
All Rule on June 19, 2007.100 This rule amended the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR),101 the export control provisions of which “are intended 
to serve the national security, foreign policy, nonproliferation, and short 
supply interests of the United States . . . [by] restrict[ing] access to dual use 
items by countries or persons that might apply such items to uses inimical 
to U.S. interests.”102 The EAR is the implementation mechanism of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979,103
                                                                                                                 
 94. CHINA MILITARY POWER REPORT, supra note 74, at 29. 
 95. Id. 
 96. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 81, at 29–30; CHINA MILITARY 
POWER REPORT, supra note 74, at 29; Bitzinger, supra note 93 (noting that China’s dependence 
on foreign technology is “especially acute” concerning jet engines, marine diesel engines, 
avionics, and submarines); Bernard D. Cole, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, Mar. 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/ 
written_testimonies/06_03_16_17wrts/06_03_16_17_cole.php (stating that the “most effective 
military capabilities being acquired by China . . . is its already capable and growing submarine 
force”). 
 97. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 81, at 29–30; CHINA MILITARY 
POWER REPORT, supra note 74, at 29. 
 98. See Andrew F. Diamond, Dying with Eyes Open or Closed: The Debate over a Chinese 
Aircraft Carrier, KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Spring 2006, 
available at http://cns.miis.edu/other/diamond060426.pdf. 
 99. McCormick, supra note 92, at 1–2 (noting that the United States “expect[s] China to 
continue making a concerted effort to acquire asymmetric and ‘leap ahead’ technologies from the 
U.S. through legal and illegal means.”). 
 100. Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33646. 
 101. 15 C.F.R. § 730-774 (2007). 
 102. 15 C.F.R. § 730.6. 
 under which Congress granted the 
 103. The Export Administration Act of 1979 actually expired in 1989. Since then, due to an 
inability to forge consensus on a new version of the Act, the president has been forced to issue a 
series of executive orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to 
maintain the U.S. export control system. See, Ian F. Ferguson, et al., Export Administration Act of 
1979 Reauthorization, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 3–4 (Mar. 11, 2002); Bush Extends 
Emergency Export Control Act, ASIAN EXPORT CONTROL OBSERVER 19, Oct./Nov. 2004, 
available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/asian/pdfs/aeco_0410.pdf. 
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executive branch the authority to regulate foreign commerce.104 Section 5 of 
the Act maintains the executive’s authority to develop lists of controlled 
items for export and proscribed countries.105 The President’s designee—the 
Commerce Department—has the responsibility of composing the dual-use 
control list, known as the Commerce Control List (CCL), as well as 
identifying those proscribed countries.106 Items included on the CCL, which 
itself is within the EAR, are “subject to the export licensing authority of 
BIS.”107
In amending the EAR, the final China Military Catch All Rule does 
four things. First, it places new restrictions on the export, reexport, or 
transfer
 
108 of approximately twenty products and associated technologies109 
that have both civilian and military applications when the exporter has 
“knowledge” or “is informed” that the items are destined for “military end-
use” in China.110 Second, the final rule establishes a presumption of denial 
for export license applications that would make “a direct and significant 
contribution” to China’s military capabilities,111 or for items going to China 
that are controlled for reasons of chemical and biological weapons 
proliferation,112 nuclear nonproliferation,113 and missile technology.114 
Third, the final rule creates a “Validated End-User” program, which allows 
specified items to be exported without a license to certain pre-approved 
Chinese entities.115 Finally, the rule raises the total dollar threshold to 
$50,000 or greater for transactions requiring an End-User Statement as 
issued by China’s Ministry of Commerce.116
A. NEW LICENSING REQUIREMENTS 
 To properly understand what 
obligations the final China Military Catch All Rule places upon U.S. 
exporters, it is first necessary to examine these provisions in closer detail. 
The China Military Catch All Rule amended section 744.21 of the EAR 
to state that an exporter may not export, reexport, or transfer any of the 
approximately twenty specified products or associated technologies without 
a license if, at the time of the transaction, the exporter either has 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Ferguson et al., supra note 103, at 2. 
 105. Long, Global Security, supra note 36, at 59. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 15 C.F.R. § 738.1(a) (2007). 
 108. Transfer is “[a] transfer to any person of items subject to the EAR either within the United 
States or outside of the United States with the knowledge or intent that the items will be shipped, 
transferred, or transmitted to an unauthorized recipient.” 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2007). 
 109. Supplement No. 2 to § 744 (2007). 
 110. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21; Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33647. 
 111. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(7) (2007). 
 112. 15 C.F.R. § 742.2(b)(4). 
 113. 15 C.F.R. § 742.2(b)(4). 
 114. 15 C.F.R. § 742.2(b)(4). 
 115. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15 (2007). 
 116. 15 C.F.R. § 748.10. 
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“knowledge” or has “been informed” by BIS that the item is intended for a 
“military end-use” in China.117
not only positive knowledge that the circumstance exists or is substantially 
certain to occur, but also an awareness of a high probability of its 
existence or future occurrence. Such awareness is inferred from evidence 
of the conscious disregard of facts known to a person and is also inferred 
from a person’s willful avoidance of facts.
 “Knowledge” is defined by the EAR as 
including: 
118
An exporter may also posses knowledge if it has “been informed” 
“either individually by specific notice” or through the publishing of an 
amendment or a separate notice in the Federal Register that informs the 
exporter “that a license is required for specific exports, reexports, or 
transfers of any item because there is an unacceptable risk of use in or 
diversion to ‘military end-use’ activities in the PRC.”
 
119 Such specific 
notice is to be given at the direction of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Export Administration.120
Supplement 2 to section 744, entitled “Restrictions on Certain Military 
End-Uses in the People’s Republic of China (PRC),” contains the list of 
items that are subject to the military end-use license requirement as defined 
in section 744.21.
 
121 The list controls items in nine of the ten categories 
contained in the CCL. No items on the list fall into “Category 0 - Nuclear 
Materials, Facilities and Equipment and Miscellaneous,” the lone 
unaffected category.122 Included in the list of items subject to the final rule 
are: depleted uranium,123 certain oscilloscopes,124 high performance 
computers,125
                                                                                                                 
 117. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(a) (2007). 
 118. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2007). 
 119. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(b). 
 120. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(b). 
 121. Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 744 (2007). 
 122. The other nine CCL categories are: 1-Materials, Chemicals, Microorganisms, and Toxins; 
2-Materials Processing; 3-Electronics; 4-Computers; 5-Telecommunications and Information 
Security; 6-Lasers and Sensors; 7-Navigation and Avionics; 8-Marine; and 9-Propulsion Systems, 
Space Vehicles and Related Equipment. 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(a) (2007). 
 123. Defined as any uranium containing less than 0.711% of the isotope U-235. See Supplement 
No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 744. 
 124. “Limited to digital oscilloscopes and transient recorders, using analog-to-digital 
conversion techniques, capable of storing transients by sequentially sampling single-shot inputs at 
great than 2.5 giga-samples per second,” and related technology. See Supplement No. 2 to 15 
C.F.R. § 744. 
 125. “Limited to computers . . . with an Adjusted Peak Performance (‘APP’) exceeding 0.5 
TeraFLOPS (WT),” and software “specially designed or modified for the ‘development’, 
‘production’, or ‘use’ of equipment controlled by 4A101.”  See Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 
744. 
 telecommunications equipment operating outside normal 
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temperatures,126 phased array antennae,127 certain airborne communications 
and inertial navigation systems,128 and aero gas turbine engines.129
Initially, in the proposed rule published in July 2006, forty-seven items 
were to be subject to the military end-use control.
 
130 However, responding 
to concerns raised in public comments, BIS “conducted a structured 
military and economic impact review” which used three criteria, “no one of 
which being solely determinative,” to determine which items were to 
remain on the list: “(1) the military applicability of each item; (2) the 
relative foreign availability of each item; and (3) the level of U.S. 
commercial exports of each item” to China.131 Of the three, BIS accorded 
military applicability the greatest weight, while indigenous Chinese 
production of an item was given greater weight than “evidence of foreign 
availability from countries that cooperate with the United States in 
multilateral export control regimes.”132 In conducting this review, “[w]hen 
BIS found limited evidence of foreign availability and significant military 
applicability, the item remained on the list, even if it was a major 
commercial export.”133
Between the proposed rule and its ultimate form, items affecting sixteen 
Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) were removed from the 
list, including items containing low-level encryption.
 
134 The export, 
reexport and transfer to China of the remaining twenty items and related 
technologies is now subject to this new licensing requirement if the exporter 
knows or is informed that the item is intended for a “military end-use” in 
China.135
                                                                                                                 
 126. “Limited to telecommunications equipment designed to operate outside the temperature 
range from 219K (-54 ˚C) to 397K ( 124 ˚C)” and related software and technology. See 
Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 744 (2007). 
 127. Specific to phased array antennae “operating above 10.5 Ghz . . .” and related software and 
technology. See Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 744. 
 128. “Other navigation direction finding equipment, airborne communication equipment, all 
aircraft inertial navigation systems no controlled under 7A003 or 7A103, and other avionic 
equipment, including parts and components, n.e.s.,” and related software and technology. See 
Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 744. 
 129. “Limited to ‘aircraft’, n.e.s., and gas turbine engines not controlled by 9A001 or 9A101,” 
and related software and technology. See Supplement No. 2 to 15 C.F.R. § 744. 
 130. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 383138. 
 131. “Q&As on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s China Policy Rule,” 2007, available at 
http://www.arentfox.com/publications/pdfs/export/QAs_bis_finalrule.pdf; see also Final Rule, 
supra note 8, at 33647–8. 
 132. “Q&As on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s China Policy Rule,” supra note 131; see 
also Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33647–8. 
 133. “Q&As on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s China Policy Rule,” supra note 131, at 
4–5; Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33647. 
 Section 744.21(f) defines “military end-use” as meaning: 
 134. Petra A. Vorwig, New Export Control Rule for Exports to China Released by Commerce 
Department, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP Publications, June 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-4590.html. 
 135. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(e)(1) (2007). 
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incorporation into a military item described on the U.S. Munitions List . . . 
[or] the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List . . . ; incorporation into 
items listed under ECCNs ending in ‘A018’ on the CCL in Supplement 
No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR; or for the ‘use’, ‘development’, or 
‘production’ of military items described on the USML or the IML, or 
items listed under ECCNs ending in ‘A018’ on the CCL. ‘Military end-
use’ also means ‘deployment’ of items classified under ECCN 9A991 as 
set forth in Supplement No. 2 to Part 744.136
If an item proposed for export is found to meet this definition of 
“military end-use,” the export license applications “will be reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether the export, reexport, or transfer 
would make a material contribution to China’s military capabilities and 
would result in advancing the country’s military activities contrary to the 
national security interests of the United States.”
 
137 This “material 
contribution” standard is more rigorous than the “direct and significant 
contribution” standard employed in section 742.4(b)(7), which is addressed 
in Part II.B herein.138 However, for now, it is important to note that BIS 
determined that “items subject to the ‘military end-use’ control were . . . 
more sensitive when destined for a ‘military end-use’ than when they are 
simply controlled for national security reasons” as in section 742.4.139 
Therefore, BIS determined these items should be “subject to a different 
licensing review standard, consistent with U.S. foreign and related export 
control policies for the PRC.”140
B. PRESUMPTION OF DENIAL 
 
The second major change to the EAR ushered in by the final China 
Military Catch All Rule is to make it U.S. policy to deny exports of CCL 
items that are controlled for national security reasons if their export would 
make a “direct and significant contribution” to China’s military 
capabilities.141 These national security licensing requirements are based on 
the goal of restricting the export, reexport or transfer of items “that would 
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country 
or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national 
security of the United States.”142
                                                                                                                 
 136. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(f) (2007). A new note to paragraph (f) also defines the terms “use,” 
“development,” “production,” “operation,” “maintenance,” and “deployment.” 
 137. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(e)(1) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 138. Section 742.4(b)(7) reads, in pertinent part: “There is a presumption of denial for license 
applications to export, reexport, or transfer items that would make a direct and significant 
contribution to the PRC’s military capabilities. . . .” 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(7). 
 139. Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33648–49. 
 140. Id. at 33649. 
 141. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(7); Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33646–47. 
 142. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(a) (2007). 
 These targeted countries include, among 
others, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Russia, 
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Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.143 Section 742.4(b)(5) notes that Kazakhstan, 
Mongolia, and Russia should be “accorded enhanced favorable 
consideration licensing treatment” in recognition of their efforts to establish 
export and reexport safeguard measures.144
China, however, receives no such consideration. It is true section 
742.4(b)(7) states that there is a presumption to approve license applications 
to export, reexport or transfer items to China for bona fide civil end-uses.
 
145 
However, the final rule also established a “presumption of denial” for items 
that would make a “direct and significant contribution” to China’s military 
capabilities.146 To illustrate what might be considered to constitute China’s 
military capabilities, the final rule included as a supplement to section 742 a 
“Description of Major Weapons Systems”147 whose advancement “would 
prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.”148 The list is 
not exhaustive, but it includes such items as: battle tanks; armored combat 
vehicles; large-caliber artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; 
warships, missiles and missile launchers, including Man-Portable Air-
Defense Systems and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles; offensive space weapons; 
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance; precision guided munitions including “smart bombs;” 
and night vision equipment.149
In the proposed version of the rule, BIS sought to deny items controlled 
for national security reasons that would have made a “material 
contribution” to China’s military capabilities, the same standard that is used 
for “military end-use” control described above in Part II.A.
 
150 Such a 
change in the review standard would have drastically changed U.S. policy 
in place since 1983, which states that BIS must either conduct “an extended 
review” or deny applications for the export or reexport of items that would 
make a “direct and significant contribution” to “a series of listed PRC 
military activities.”151 In the final rule, BIS decided to maintain the “direct 
and significant” standard, as it judged the “material contribution” standard 
“too broad” to be used to review national security-controlled items.152 
However, in a slightly smaller policy shift, for the final rule, BIS decided 
“to apply it to PRC military capabilities as a whole, rather than a limited list 
of military activities.”153
                                                                                                                 
 143. See “Country Group D:1,” Supplement No. 1 to 15 C.F.R. § 740 (2007). 
 144. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(5). 
 145. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(7); Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33646. 
 146. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(7). 
 147. “Description of Major Weapons Systems,” Supplement No. 7 to 15 C.F.R. § 742 (2007). 
 148. 15 C.F.R. § 742.4(a) (2007). 
 149. “Description of Major Weapons Systems,” Supplement No. 7 to 15 C.F.R. § 742. 
 150. Proposed Rule, supra note 1, at 38313; Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33647. 
 151. Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33647. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 
170 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 3 
Finally, for the export and reexport of items to China that are controlled 
for reasons of chemical and biological proliferation,154 nuclear 
nonproliferation,155 and missile technology,156 the final rule imposes the 
same “presumption of denial” that is employed for license applications for 
export of national security-controlled items.157 This is done by stating that 
license applications covered by a particular section (i.e., “missile 
technology”) “when destined to the People’s Republic of China, will be 
reviewed in accordance with the licensing policies in both paragraph (b) of 
[that particular] section and §742.4(b)(7).”158
C. VALIDATED END-USER PROGRAM 
 
The first two elements of the China Military Catch All Rule as 
described above involve tightening U.S. export licensing policy for specific 
items that would be exported, reexported, or transferred to China. The third 
and fourth elements of the final rule are more liberalizing in nature, as they 
comprise the “carrots” to go along with the aforementioned “sticks.” 
The third change brought about by the final rule is the creation of the 
Validated End-User (VEU), a new program that “permits the export, 
reexport, and transfer to validated end-users of any eligible items159 that 
will be used in a specific eligible destination.”160 A validated end-user is an 
end-user161 that has been approved by the End-User Review Committee 
pursuant to the requirements laid out in section 748.15 of the EAR.162 The 
End-User Review Committee is made up of representatives of the 
Departments of Commerce (which also chairs the Committee), Defense, 
Energy, and State, as well as other appropriate agencies.163 The 
Committee’s unanimous vote is necessary to authorize VEU status for a 
potential candidate or to include additional eligible items in the pre-existing 
authorization.164 However, a majority vote will suffice to remove VEU 
authorization from an end-user or to remove a previously eligible item from 
a pre-existing authorization.165
                                                                                                                 
 154. 15 C.F.R. § 742.2 (2007). 
 155. 15 C.F.R. § 742.3. 
 156. 15 C.F.R. § 742.5. 
 157. 15 C.F.R. § 742.2(a)(f); Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33646. 
 158. 15 C.F.R. § 742.3(b)(4). See also 15 C.F.R. § 742.2(b)(4); 15 C.F.R. § 742.5(b)(4). 
 159. It should be noted that “[i]tems controlled under the EAR for missile technology (MT) and 
crime control (CC) reasons may not be exported or reexported under [VEU] authorization.” 15 
C.F.R. § 748.15(c) (2007). 
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 162. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15. 
 163. “End-User Review Committee Procedures,” Supplement No. 9 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 164. Supplement No. 9 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 165. Supplement No. 9 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 The End-User Review Committee has thirty 
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days to complete its review and make determinations whether to grant VEU 
authorization to the candidate once the candidate’s complete application in 
the form of an advisory opinion request166 has been “circulated to all [End-
User Review Committee] agencies.”167
This request for VEU authorization, in order to be approved by the End-
User Review Committee, must contain certain information about the 
prospective validated end-user.
 
168 This information must include, among 
other details, the name of the proposed VEU candidate and its contact 
information, “an overview of the structure, ownership and business of the 
prospective validated end-user,” a “list of the items proposed for VEU 
authorization approval and their intended end-uses,” “the physical 
address(es) of the location(s) where the item(s) will be used,” any plans for 
the reexport or transfer of the item, and a description of the record keeping 
system that is in place and how it will ensure compliance with VEU 
requirements.169 Finally, the request must include, on the original letterhead 
of the prospective VEU, “an original statement . . . signed and dated by a 
person who has authority to legally bind the prospective [VEU]” certifying 
that the prospective VEU will comply with all VEU requirements, 
“including the requirement that items received under authorization VEU 
will only be used for civil end-uses,” and that the candidate “agrees to allow 
on-site reviews by U.S. Government officials to verify the end-user’s 
compliance with the conditions of the VEU authorization.”170
Once the End-User Review Committee receives all necessary materials, 
it will then consider the prospective VEU’s application, taking into account 
a number of factors. These factors include: the candidate’s past compliance 
with U.S. export controls, its record of “exclusive engagement in civil end-
use activities,” its capability to comply with VEU requirements, the 
necessity of “on-site review prior to approval” and its agreement to further 
on-site reviews to ensure compliance, and the candidate’s “relationship with 
U.S. and foreign companies.”
 
171 Additionally, the Committee will consider 
the “status of export controls”172 and “the support and adherence to 
multilateral export control regimes173
                                                                                                                 
 166. Supplement No. 9 to 15 C.F.R. § 748 (2007). 
 167. Supplement No. 9 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 168. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15(a)(1) (2007). See also “End-User Review Committee Procedures,” 
Supplement No. 9 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 169. “Information Required in Requests for Validated End-User (VEU) Authorization,” 
Supplement No. 8 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 170. Supplement No. 8 to 15 C.F.R. § 748. 
 171. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15(a)(2). 
 of the government of the eligible 
 172. For information on the status of China’s export controls, see EVAN S. MEDEIROS, 
CHASING THE DRAGON (2005) available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/ 
RAND_MG353.sum.pdf; JONATHAN DAVIS, EXPORT CONTROLS IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, (2005) available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/CITS%20China%20Final.pdf. 
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destination.”174 Currently, the only two eligible destinations are China and, 
most recently, India.175 Supplement 7 to section 748 provides a list of 
“validated end-users, respective eligible items and eligible destinations.”176 
As of October 3, 2008, the list contained only five validated Chinese end-
users.177
If approved for VEU status, an eligible end-user may only use the items 
obtained under VEU for civil end-uses.
 
178 Additionally, the validated end-
user may only use the item “at the end-user’s own facility located in an 
eligible destination or at a facility located in an eligible destination over 
which the end-user demonstrates effective control.”179 Finally, exporters 
and reexporters who utilized VEU are required to submit annual reports to 
BIS detailing the name and address of each validated end-user that received 
items, the quantity and value of such items, and the ECCNs of these 
items.180
D. END-USER STATEMENTS
 
181
The fourth and final change implemented by the final China Military 
Catch All Rule is to revise the situations in which a PRC End-User 
Statement must be obtained. Previously, pursuant to the end-use visit 
understanding of April 2004 between China’s Vice Minister of Commerce 
and the U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, 
exporters were required to obtain PRC End-User Statements from China’s 
Ministry of Commerce “for all exports [to China] of items on the CCL 
requiring a license” valued at over $5,000.
 
182 The final rule raises the dollar 
threshold triggering the requirement of obtaining a PRC End-User 
Statement when “the total value of [the] transaction exceeds $50,000.”183
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China ‘validated’ as U.S. export users, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 29, 2007, at 16. A 
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2008, available at http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/reports/2007/inchinawetrust.pdf. 
 178. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15(d) (2007). 
 179. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15(d)(1). 
 180. 15 C.F.R. § 748.15(f)(1)(i). 
 181. Prior to the publication of the final rule, the EAR used the term “PRC End-User 
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of Commerce],” the final rule amended the EAR to now refer to these documents as “PRC End-
User Statements.”  See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33650. 
 182. Final Rule, supra note 8, at 33650. 
 183. 15 C.F.R. § 748.10(b)(3) (2007). 
 
2008] Dueling Over Dual-Use Goods 173 
This does not apply to the export of any computer to China that requires a 
license184 or items classified under ECCN 6A003 (cameras),185 as these 
items, regardless of dollar value, require a PRC End-User Statement due to 
U.S. national security concerns.186
If the export of an item necessitates that a PRC End-User Statement be 
obtained from China’s Ministry of Commerce, it is incumbent upon the 
importer in China to obtain the PRC End-User Statement
 
187 signed by an 
official in the Department of Mechanic, Electronic and High Technology 
Industries, Export Control Division I of China’s Ministry of Commerce 
with the Ministry’s seal affixed to the Statement.188 Additionally, the PRC 
End-User Statement must include the title of contract, the names of the 
exporter and importer, the end-user and end-use, and a description of the 
item, dollar value and quantity, along with the importer’s signature.189
III. IMPACT OF THE CHINA MILITARY CATCH ALL RULE 
 
The aforementioned changes to U.S. export control policy vis-à-vis 
China will have widespread implications for U.S. exporters, U.S. 
competitiveness abroad, and U.S. national security. The final rule 
unnecessarily undermines U.S. economic interests abroad by expanding the 
potential liability for U.S. exporters and increasing their administrative 
burdens, disproportionately affecting small and medium business.190 This 
expanded liability is not limited just to exporters, as businesses throughout 
the supply chain will now be subject to nebulous provisions and stiff 
penalties.191 Additionally, the extra-territorial impact of the rule by 
including “reexports” within its scope further expands the potential liability 
to foreign suppliers, creating an incentive for them to “design-out” U.S. 
products so as to escape this liability trap.192 The ultimate effect of these 
realities will be to place further requirements on already burdened 
American businesses193
                                                                                                                 
 184. 15 C.F.R. § 748.10(b)(3). 
 185. 15 C.F.R. § 748.10(b)(3). 
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 191. Donald A. Weadon, Jr., & Carol A. Kalinoski, US blunders on with China military-export 
rule, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 22, 2006, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ 
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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HA11Cb01.html. 
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supra note 15. 
 193. Mark Foulon & Christopher A. Padilla, In Pursuit of Security and Prosperity: Technology 
Controls for a New Era, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY, Vol. 30, Spring 2007, at 83, available at 
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hyper-competitive Chinese market, as other foreign suppliers are not so 
burdened.194
The unilateral nature of the rule further undermines its potential 
efficacy, as no U.S. allies or major trading partners are willing to undertake 
similar restrictions on their trade with China.
 
195 This will further compound 
the damage to U.S. business competitiveness in the Chinese marketplace, 
the access to which is increasingly vital to American businesses.196 These 
losses will result in reduced profits for many cutting edge commercial 
enterprises in the United States, which will ultimately mean lower levels of 
investment in vital R&D.197 Such reductions in private R&D will only serve 
to undermine U.S. national security, as the Pentagon and America’s military 
superiority is increasingly reliant on private sector R&D.198
A. INCREASED LIABILITY 
 Thus, the final 
China Military Catch All Rule may very well exacerbate the very problems 
it was designed to solve. 
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration began to shift the burden for 
policing export control compliance from the government to the private 
sector.199 Industry became more responsible for ensuring compliance with 
applicable export rules and regulations.200 From a practical standpoint, such 
a shift makes sense. Intuitively, exporters tend to have much more technical 
understanding of their own items intended for export than the 
government.201 Additionally, as the government tends to be predominantly 
focused on national security concerns, an increased governmental role 
might lead to overly conservative reviewing policies, especially with 
respect to high-technology items, potentially prompting delays and rising 
denial rates.202
However, this burden-shifting also means that companies are required 
to determine when end-users in China are likely to use dual-use items for a 
military end-use.
 
203
                                                                                                                 
http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_foulon-padilla.pdf (noting that “U.S. firms face an 
ever-growing challenge to operate profitably in a hypercompetitive global marketplace”). 
 194. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 195. Freedenberg, supra note 15. 
 196. THE COALITION FOR SECURITY AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 18, at 5. 
 197. See Paarlberg, supra note 20, at 129–30. 
 198. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 199. Gerth & Schmitt, supra note 40. 
 200. Corr, supra note 27, at 491–92. 
 201. Gregory W. Bowman, E-mails, Servers, and Software: U.S. Export Controls for the 
Modern Era, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 319, 365–66 (Winter 2004). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Gerth & Schmitt, supra note 40. 
 Under the final rule, U.S. exporters are required to 
obtain a license when they have “knowledge” that their item for export is 
destined for a “military end-use” in China. Under the EAR, “knowledge is 
2008] Dueling Over Dual-Use Goods 175 
broader than actual knowledge, and would include constructive knowledge 
where the exporter had reason to know or believe, based on the 
circumstances, that there was a military end-use, or intentionally blinded 
itself to the facts.”204 Thus, for BIS to establish a violation of export 
regulations, “it is sufficient for BIS to show that the exporter should have 
been aware that the transaction would be a violation of the EAR without 
hard evidence of actual knowledge.”205 While it is true that BIS used the 
previously existing definition of “knowledge” in the EAR and thus did not 
modify the definition with respect to the final rule,206 it is the subject 
(Chinese end-users) about which exporters must have knowledge that 
creates the potential for drastically expanded liability.207
Private sector officials have been complaining to the government for 
the last decade that they are not in a position to make informed 
determinations on Chinese end-users.
 
208 This is because the Chinese 
military is a notoriously nebulous entity and “has long played a role in 
commercial ventures” and it is often “difficult to distinguish between 
military officers’ personal and professional dealings.”209 Despite the rapid 
growth of privately-owned businesses in China, state-owned enterprises are 
still a key element in the Chinese economy.210 Some of these state-owned 
enterprises are owned or controlled by the Chinese military.211 Furthermore, 
there are a number of universities and supposedly private enterprises that 
have direct or indirect ties to the Chinese military.212 This has prompted one 
export control specialist to state that “[e]xporters should rightly fear a high 
risk of liability under such a broad definition of knowledge since it is 
frequently difficult for exporters to determine the ultimate use of products 
shipped to China.”213
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“impossible” to trade with Chinese entities without dealing with the 
government to some extent, due to China’s economic structure.214
Thus, in order to avoid liability, exporters must engage in much greater 
due diligence to ensure, to the best of their ability, that their items for 
export are not destined for a military end-use in China.
 
215 Currently, 
exporters are required not only to review various U.S. government lists such 
as the Denial List and the Entity List,216 but they will have to conduct 
increased customer screening of, and investigation into, Chinese end-users 
who are not on such lists.217 Furthermore, it is quite possible that the 
“presumption of denial” of certain licenses ushered in by the final China 
Military Catch All Rule will, “as a matter of practice, ‘bleed over’ to 
applications for commercial uses in China, requiring exporters to go to 
great lengths to demonstrate the bona fide commercial use of its Chinese 
customers.”218 These increased due diligence measures will especially 
burden small- and medium-sized firms, as they will have to divert limited 
resources to meet these rising administrative costs.219 The ironic twist is 
that, by shifting the compliance burden on to private companies, the 
government has freed up resources to bolster its enforcement activities.220
However, the chain of liability does not end with the exporter. The final 
rule explicitly applies to reexports as well, resulting in the extra-territorial 
extension of liability to firms outside the United States who reexport U.S.-
origin items.
 
221 Such extraterritorial controls can complicate transactions, 
serving as a disincentive for foreign buyers to choose U.S. exporters.222
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This is especially true when the controls—as here—are unilateral in nature 
and when the items in question are available from vendors in other 
countries.223 The liability for U.S. exporters is daunting in such transactions 
as “the overseas re-exporter typically lacks information as to whether the 
U.S. technology, product, or component is subject to re-export licensing 
requirements, and the U.S. exporter often does not provide sufficient 
information.”224
Noting that the United States is one of only a few countries that impose 
reexport controls, the Coalition for Security and Competitiveness has 
highlighted the significant compliance burden reexport controls impose on 
both U.S. companies and their foreign trading partners.
 
225 Foreign 
companies are often discouraged by the complexity of these reexport 
controls from procuring U.S.-origin products, resulting in these same 
foreign companies “designing out” U.S. components “in favor of 
components from countries without stringent re-export controls.”226 
Japanese companies in particular are known to be especially careful not to 
violate U.S. export control regulations, prompting them to redesign their 
products to eliminate U.S. components.227 Reexporters in other countries 
are likely to view the extraterritorial effect of the China Military Catch All 
Rule as confirmation that American firms are unreliable suppliers.228 Allied 
nations are likely to further respond by using their blocking statutes229 to 
limit the extraterritorial impact of this rule on their domestic businesses.230
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With respect to Chinese companies, they already view the United States to 
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be the least reliable and most restrictive of their major trading partners.231 
The final rule “can only serve to reinforce in the Chinese that negative 
perception.”232
This “remarkable liability chain” extends even further. The final rule 
also applies to the “transfer”
 
233 of controlled items, which implicates 
entities throughout the supply chain.234 These entities include shippers, 
freight forwarders, banks, accountants and consultants.235 Additionally, 
“when viewed through the lens of the corporate-knowledge doctrine, the 
opportunities for serious liability exposure abound for service providers as 
well.”236
No U.S. person shall, without a license from BIS, knowingly support an 
export, reexport, or transfer that does not have a license as required by this 
section. Support means any action, including financing, transportation, and 
freight forwarding, by which a person facilitates an export, reexport, or 
transfer without being the actual exporter or reexporter.
 The language of section 744.6 of the EAR ensures their liability, 
by stating that: 
237
It is this language that prompted one export control specialist to state 
that “with higher penalties under the Patriot Act, fines for even minor 
infractions skyrocket, creating an exposure umbrella resembling a 
mushroom cloud.”
 
238
B. REDUCED U.S. COMPETITIVENESS 
 
Statistics clearly demonstrate the reasons why U.S. companies are so 
enamored with the Chinese market. In 2006, the United States exported 
$17.7 billion worth of high-tech goods to China, an increase of forty-four 
percent and more than the total value of U.S. exports to India, Russia and 
Thailand combined.239 Since 2000, U.S. exports to China have risen 240 
percent, more than to any other market.240
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 237. 15 C.F.R. § 744.6(a)(1)(ii) (2007). 
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LIMITED, Aug. 1, 2006, at 11, available at LEXIS. 
 239. Mancuso, supra note 71. 
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EXPORTS, Vol. 2007, No. 9, Sept. 2007, available at LEXIS. 
 Applied Materials, a leading 
Silicon Valley semiconductor company, predicted in 2002 that over the next 
ten years, approximately twenty percent of its revenues could come from 
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trade with China.241 Additionally, China is on track to overtake Japan as the 
third-largest destination for U.S. exports sometime in the immediate 
future.242 Statistics such as those make it easy to see why James Sasser, 
U.S. Ambassador to China during the Clinton administration, once 
remarked that “[t]he Chinese really don’t do any lobbying. The heavy 
lifting is done by the American business community.”243
For the American business community, the Final China Military Catch 
All Rule could prove to be the perfect storm, combining with a number of 
external factors to undermine U.S competitiveness. First, the rule and its 
restrictions are unilateral in nature.
 
244 Not one U.S. Wassenaar Arrangement 
ally has agreed to enact similar provisions.245 Up until the 1980s, unilateral 
U.S. export controls were still somewhat effective, as most other nations in 
the world could not compete technologically with the United States.246 
However, globalization has leveled the technological playing field to the 
point that such unilateral controls are doomed to failure.247 Technologically 
advanced countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia are 
more than capable of supplying dual-use technology to China.248 Second, 
European companies are also more than willing to trade with China, a fact 
that stems from a very different view of Beijing’s ascendancy.249 The U.S. 
view is best encapsulated by a 2006 Pentagon report on China which stated 
that “China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United 
States and to field disruptive military technologies that could over time 
offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter 
strategies.”250 Europe tends not to view China as an emerging threat and 
regards engagement, as opposed to containment, as the proper way to 
“minimize any risks associated with Beijing’s emergence as a global 
player.”251
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members, including much of Europe, “simply do not share the U.S. view of 
China as a restricted destination.”252
These divergent viewpoints toward China further undermine the 
efficacy of U.S. export controls and American business competitiveness, 
because U.S. policy implicitly assumes cooperation from Wassenaar 
Arrangement members.
 
253 In determining whether a certain product is 
available outside the United States (i.e. “foreign availability”), the Coalition 
for Security and Competitiveness states that the Commerce Department 
assumes countries that participate in the same multilateral export control 
regimes as the United States have adopted the same dual-use controls as the 
United States.254 The Commerce Department’s process for determining 
“foreign availability” ignores the differences in these countries’ export 
controls, which is even more important in the context of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement where members are not obligated to harmonize their control 
lists.255 Thus, “many items restricted by the United States are available in 
Wassenaar member countries because of differences, for example, in 
licensing administration, compliance and enforcement procedures, technical 
interpretation of the lists and application of re-export rules.”256 One of the 
most fundamental differences between the now defunct CoCom and the 
Wassenaar Arrangement is the absence of authority for a state to veto an 
export by a fellow member, thus preventing the sale altogether.257 Thus, 
“items subject to U.S. controls are now more readily available in other 
countries, including members of international regimes.”258
Craig Barrett, the CEO of Intel, equated these unilateral U.S. export 
controls on goods going to China to “fighting with one hand tied behind my 
back.”
 
259 Barrett’s comment underscores the fundamental importance of 
multilateral approaches to export controls if they are to be effective.260 
However, the final China Military Catch All Rule is not only unilateral in 
nature; it seeks to control goods that are widely available from foreign 
companies.261
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can take more than six months for U.S. companies to secure an export 
license for goods going to China.262 James Jochum, the Commerce 
Department’s Assistant Secretary for Import Administration, has said that 
the U.S. government “take[s] a longer time reviewing licenses to China than 
to any other destination.”263 In 2003, an export application for China took, 
on average, seventy-two days, longer than for any other country.264 Such 
delays inevitably force the foreign buyer to look elsewhere.265 For example, 
in 2002, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), 
one of China’s largest semiconductor producers, planned to purchase high-
tech items from Silicon Valley-based Applied Materials, but after waiting 
months for license approval, SMIC instead placed its order with a Swedish 
company, costing Applied Materials a multi-million dollar deal.266 As 
Joseph Xie of SMIC said, “We love to do business with the U.S., but we 
can’t wait forever. Europe and Japan are getting the business.”267
C. REDUCED U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
 
As U.S. exporters go, so goes American military superiority.268 This is 
due to a fundamental shift in the way the Pentagon constitutes U.S. military 
hegemony. During the Cold War, the U.S. defense industry spent billions of 
dollars specially designing complex, top-secret weapons systems for the 
Pentagon.269 That is no longer the case, as “a revolution has turned the U.S. 
defense industry upside down.”270 Nowadays, it is the private sector that 
increasingly supplies the Pentagon, as very little is custom-made for the 
military anymore.271 Thus, the products from the private sector are 
“increasingly used to supply off-the-shelf technology for military 
applications, as government entities find that higher quality and lower 
prices are available on the open market.”272
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However, these private sector companies increasingly rely on exports to 
generate a profit, with no bigger market than China.273 The profits are then 
reinvested in R&D to generate the next generation of cutting edge goods.274 
The private sector shares of total R&D in the United States have increased 
from fifty percent in the mid-1980s to more than sixty-six percent of total 
R&D in 2003.275 Overall, total U.S. R&D is greater than $250 billion 
annually, and while vital in promoting U.S. economic growth and 
international competitiveness, “[it is] also at the foundation of U.S. military 
superiority.”276 Private R&D also has the added advantage of being 
“unhampered by bureaucratic and security restrictions,” making it “more 
flexible, more innovative, and better organized.”277 By reinvesting their 
profits, which are substantially derived from exports, U.S. private sector 
companies can further solidify America’s technological superiority.278 
Maintaining this technological superiority, given the Pentagon’s increasing 
reliance on the commercial sector, is the foundation of American military 
hegemony.279
There is potentially an additional adverse impact on U.S. national 
security that must be noted. It is clear that China will continue to seek high-
tech dual-use items despite the unilateral U.S. controls contained in the 
China Military Catch All Rule.
 
280 To secure its access to these increasingly 
vital items, China, with its surging foreign currency reserves, “will either 
partner with, or purchase outright, capable non-U.S. suppliers.”281 This will 
provide China at some point thereafter with the capability to domestically 
produce these goods, and once its own domestic demand is met, global 
prices can be expected to drop.282 These Chinese producers will then turn 
their sights to exporting to the U.S. market, causing prices to drop further, 
and potentially driving out of business many of the U.S. suppliers for these 
dual-use goods, “essentially gutting the U.S. defense industrial base.”283
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The focus of U.S. export policy should be to maintain American 
dominance in high-technology goods. This is the best path to protecting 
U.S. national security and American business interests, both at home and 
abroad. Instead, the final China Military Catch All Rule attempts to shift the 
focus to the potential for China’s military to rival that of the United States. 
It seeks to do this by placing unilateral restrictions on dual-use goods that 
China can easily purchase from our foreign competitors. By denying China 
access to our dual-use technology, the United States is sending Beijing a 
clear message that Washington views China much more as a strategic 
competitor than a strategic partner. Such messages only serve to undermine 
efforts to bring China more into the international system as a “responsible 
stakeholder.” However, by treating China as a strategic adversary, this 
current U.S. policy will unfortunately only make conflict between the 
United States and China more likely. Absent real multilateral efforts on the 
part of the United States, in such a conflict, China will most certainly have 
access to these dual-use items through our allies, a tragic twist of fate 
indeed. 
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